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Abstract
What determines the success or failure of far-right organisations? This article uses new qualitative 
data to explain the sudden rise and subsequent decline of the English Defence League, an anti-
Islamic, street protest organisation established in the UK in 2009. We explain the rise and 
fall of the English Defence League through the lens of the theory of collective action to show 
that the English Defence League initially motivated activism by supplying selective incentives 
that were enhanced by the participation of others. The pursuit of ‘participatory crowding’ led 
to indiscriminate recruitment into the organisation that enabled numbers to expand into the 
thousands, but ultimately caused the English Defence League’s downfall because it resulted in 
the presence of large numbers of ‘marginal members’ with low levels of commitment whose 
subsequent exit was decisively destructive. Self-governance mechanisms to ensure greater loyalty 
from members could have prevented the English Defence League’s decline but would also have 
limited its initial success.
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What determines the success or failure of far-right organisations? This article uses new 
data to explain the sudden rise and subsequent decline of the English Defence League 
(EDL), an anti-Islamic, street protest organisation established in the UK in 2009. In con-
trast with other European countries, the UK far right has predominately been a fringe 
phenomenon, attracting relatively few voters and activists. In the 1970s, the National 
Front did mobilise significant numbers of supporters and achieved limited local electoral 
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success (Fielding, 1981; Walker, 1977), and in the 2000s, the British National Party 
(BNP) won a number of local authority seats and close to a million votes and two Members 
of the European Parliament (MEPs) at the 2009 European Parliament elections (Goodwin, 
2010, 2011), but both of these successes proved short-lived – each organisation was effec-
tively moribund a decade after the peak of its success. In 2010 and 2011, the EDL attracted 
thousands of participants to its public demonstrations, but it then also experienced a steep 
decline which saw numbers dwindle to a few hundred participants and the end of its 
capacity for mass mobilisation. This article uses qualitative research evidence to explain 
the trajectory of the EDL and thereby meets Goodwin’s (2011: 50) challenge of getting 
inside ‘the black box of right-wing extremist organisations’ to understand how activists 
are recruited and commitment is sustained (or not).
We explain the rise and fall of the EDL through the lens of the theory of collective 
action (Olson, 1965; Ostrom, 1998; Tullock, 1971) to show that the EDL initially moti-
vated activism by supplying selective incentives that were enhanced by the participation 
of others – what Iannaccone (1992) termed ‘participatory crowding’. The pursuit of par-
ticipatory crowding led to indiscriminate recruitment into the organisation that enabled 
numbers to expand into the thousands, but ultimately caused the EDL’s downfall because 
it resulted in the presence of large numbers of ‘marginal members’ with low levels of 
commitment whose subsequent exit was decisively destructive. Self-governance mecha-
nisms to ensure greater loyalty from members could have prevented this decline but 
would also have limited the group’s initial success.
Most studies of right-wing extremism utilise either demand-side or supply-side expla-
nations. Demand-side explanations suggest far-right groups will appeal to individuals 
with low socioeconomic status in times of social and economic uncertainty (Betz, 1998; 
Falter and Schumann, 1988), or show that far-right activism may satisfy participant 
demands for dignity and fraternity (Ezekiel, 1995; Fryer and Levitt, 2012). In the context 
of the EDL, scholars have identified the salience of the group’s Islamophobic rhetoric to 
young, White, working-class men lacking educational or employment opportunities 
(Goodwin et al., 2016; Kassimeris and Jackson, 2015; Winlow et al., 2017), and the emo-
tional appeal of EDL activism to these individuals (Busher, 2016; Pilkington, 2016).
Supply-side approaches emphasise the role of political organisations in providing 
opportunities for political participation and suggest that the organisation of parties and 
groups will be a key determinant of their success or failure (Dinas et al., 2016; Kitschelt, 
1995; Mudde, 2007). In respect of the EDL, scholars have identified organisational inept-
itude and internal conflict over the ends of the group and the means to achieve them 
(Busher, 2016), and the resignation of its founder Tommy Robinson (Goodwin et al., 
2016: 5; Pilkington, 2016: 40–41) as important determinants of the group’s fortunes.
However, demand-side explanations may struggle to explain why some people with 
particular socioeconomic characteristics become involved in far-right activism while oth-
ers do not. Demand-side approaches may therefore treat extreme right success as ‘a pas-
sive consequence of macro-level socioeconomic developments’ with little regard to the 
agency of leaders or members (Mudde, 2007: 4). In addition, in analysing supply-side 
factors, it is important to identify the relevant institutional factors, not their consequences. 
Hence, we believe that previous explanations of the EDL’s failure have wrongly attrib-
uted causal weight to symptoms of the group’s decline, whereas the real explanation con-
cerns the failure of the group to put in place appropriate self-governance mechanisms.
We concur with Norris (2005) that a satisfactory explanation of far-right electoral sup-
port or, in our case, activism must understand the interaction of supply and demand. A 
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recent study of the initial success and subsequent failure of the Ku Klux Klan in the 1920s 
shows how supply and demand interactions may determine the fortunes of a far-right 
organisation. Fryer and Levitt (2012) identify the tremendous demand for hatred, reli-
gious intolerance and, also, fraternal membership in the US at this time. Klan member-
ship peaked at around four million people in 1924, but following the conviction of a 
high-profile Klan member for rape and murder, membership declined to approximately 
1% of its peak by 1930. The authors argue that this volatility can be explained by the 
readiness of the Klan to supply membership to any supporter who demanded it: many 
Klan members were recruited in the years immediately prior to the conviction by sales 
agents who received financial rewards for recruiting new members, regardless of their 
loyalty to the group. Many of these recruits also belonged to other fraternal organisations 
that offered an alternative source of many of the benefits of Klan membership. The Klan’s 
failure to put in place mechanisms to ensure the loyalty of its recruits resulted in a mem-
bership base with low levels of attachment who exited the Klan following the high-profile 
conviction. Fryer and Levitt use the term ‘marginal members’ to identity members with 
low levels of attachment who will exit a group when the utility associated with their 
membership is reduced. Our study of the EDL’s rise and decline similarly identified mar-
ginal members as an important factor in the organisation’s collapse.
This article explains the rise and fall of the EDL by uniting supply and demand factors 
– we identify the supply-side factors that meant the EDL was initially able, but then 
became unable, to meet the demands of its members. This explanation is grounded in the 
theory of collective action set out by Olson (1965), Tullock (1971) and Ostrom (1998), 
that identifies a fundamental problem of politics that the benefits of political action accrue 
to both participants and non-participants, whereas the costs are borne by participants 
alone, so it is in each individual’s self-interest to freeride on the activism of others. It is 
generally understood that successful groups solve this collective action problem by pro-
viding benefits exclusively to participants that act as selective incentives to motivate 
participation. These benefits are supplied as club goods – goods that are neither purely 
public nor private but can be supplied exclusively to many people – and may include 
welfare, entertainment, friendship networks and access to public office (Buchanan, 1965; 
Olson, 1965).
We seek to explain far-right activism using the theory of collective action and use the 
case of far-right activism to test the theory of collective action. Specifically, we test the 
hypothesis that far-right activism faces an inherent collective action problem and that 
significant features of the organisation, operation and fortunes of far-right groups are 
explained by the way that they solve this problem.
Methodology
Our data were principally collected from ethnographic fieldwork and formal and informal 
interviews. Between February 2013 and June 2016, we attended a total of 12 demonstra-
tions held by the EDL and Pegida UK (the anti-Islam protest group briefly led by Robinson 
after his departure from the EDL) in English towns and cities, including London, 
Manchester, Newcastle and Rotherham. Through attending EDL demonstrations, a rap-
port was developed with regional and divisional leaders, which resulted in invitations to 
two ‘meet-and-greet’ sessions for new and prospective EDL members, social gatherings 
at pubs and membership of a closed EDL Facebook group. During fieldwork, informal, 
unstructured interviews were undertaken with 17 activists and many more were engaged 
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in short conversations about their activism. Eight of these activists were interviewed on 
more than one occasion, enabling their views to be tracked over time. Field notes – includ-
ing details of informal interviews – were recorded in situ or immediately after the event. 
Fieldwork was supplemented by semi-structured, formal interviews with key informants, 
in which five participants, including EDL founder and original leader Tommy Robinson, 
were approached in 2016 and invited to reflect on their experience as activists. These 
formal interviews were shaped by a question guide that addressed entry into the group, 
reasons for maintaining or ceasing activism and perceived reasons for the EDL’s decline, 
while also allowing flexibility to discuss other issues that arose. As is common in much 
field research, the sample recruited was nonprobabilistic and purposive, not aiming for 
statistical representativeness, but nevertheless seeking to select respondents with a range 
of sociological characteristics; our respondents ranged from 16 to 54 years of age; were 
based in the Greater London, the Midlands and Norfolk; and comprised 15 men and 5 
women. In total, approximately 70 hours were spent directly interacting with present or 
former EDL activists in the form of participant observation at events and formal and 
informal interviews, and 36 interviews were conducted with 20 individuals. At this point, 
our field notes and interviews began to replicate the same data, indicating that saturation 
point had been reached. This saturation point is consistent with that found by other quali-
tative studies (Guest et al., 2006).
Ethical approval for the research (participant observation and formal and informal 
interviews) was obtained from our university Research Ethics Panel prior to commence-
ment. All activists involved in direct interactions during fieldwork were aware of the 
researchers’ status. However, the largely anonymous nature of demonstrations – and the 
crowds they attracted – meant that it was impossible for the researchers to identify them-
selves to every activist.
Our data analysis involved a process of descriptive inference from data that principally 
comprised field notes of observations and informal interviews and transcripts of formal 
interviews. We also had transcripts of formal speeches, EDL mission statements and the 
group’s public and private social media output. To facilitate our search for observable 
implications and to make sense of this large quantity of data – field notes and transcripts 
alone amounted to 86,000 words – we used a deductively and inductively derived coding 
framework. It is widely accepted that the coding process will be informed by prior theo-
retical interests, and researchers should explicitly acknowledge these when recounting 
their approach to data analysis and transparently record their coding procedures to boost 
the reliability of their research (Benaquisto, 2008; Layder, 1998; Merriam and Tisdell, 
2016; Saldana, 2009). We first deductively identified the concepts that reflected our 
hypothesis that far-right activism faces an inherent collective action problem and that 
significant features of the organisation, operation and fortunes of far-right groups are 
explained by the way that they solve this problem: selective incentives, operational fea-
tures, organisational features, rise and decline. We then turned to our data and identified 
segments relevant to these concepts (and the hypothesis being tested) and coded these 
segments with a word or short description that captured the salient features of the text or 
image, such as, ‘drug usage’, ‘violence’, ‘war analogy’, ‘Muslim grooming gangs’, ‘loy-
alty’, ‘in-fighting’ and ‘indiscriminate recruitment’ (see Saldana, 2009: 14). Some of 
these labels came from us (e.g. ‘war analogy’) whereas others represented the language 
used by our respondents (e.g. ‘Muslim grooming gang’). We then grouped like segments 
together based on patterns of similarity. These grouped patterns became our inductively 
derived categories. For example, we identified a similarity between ‘war analogies’ and 
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‘Muslim grooming gangs’ because the coded data referred to the purported protection of 
country and family by EDL members. This pattern was used to develop the inductive 
category of increased self-worth that, in turn, we understood to be a selective incentive 
and an observable implication of our hypothesis. Similarly, we identified a resemblance 
between ‘dual Facebook accounts’ and ‘face coverings’ because the coded data reflected 
an avoidance of stigmatising behaviour. This commonality enabled us to develop the 
inductive category of commitment mechanisms, an organisational feature of the EDL 
that we believe reflected its approach to solving the collective action problem. As is often 
the case with qualitative research, our data analysis was an iterative process that was at 
times both inductive and deductive (Merriam and Tisdell, 2016: 202).
We also considered alternative explanations for the rapid collapse of the EDL and 
purposefully looked for data that supported these explanations. Our alertness to the pos-
sibility that data may be inconsistent with our theory, and our consideration of alternative 
explanations, meant that we reduced the risk that our theoretical perspective enforced ‘a 
pre-determined explanatory grid on the data’ and increased the validity of our research 
(Layder, 1998: 113; Merriam and Tisdell, 2016: 248).
The great strength of qualitative research is the depth and richness of the data that can 
be generated and the insights thereby offered into the subjective perceptions of individuals. 
While quantitative research can provide useful information about the socioeconomic pro-
file of far-right activists (e.g. Goodwin et al., 2016) and textual analysis of far-right publi-
cations can generate important data about their public ideology (e.g. Kassimeris and 
Jackson, 2015), qualitative research generates data about the subjective, personal experi-
ences of activists. However, a notable feature of our data was the consistency of responses. 
While personal circumstances or characteristics differed, every activist gave an account of 
the direct, personal benefits of EDL activism consistent with the theory of collective action.
Descriptive inference can be made with some, but never complete, certainty. First, the 
process of inference involves judgements about what data are important or not. Second, 
new data may be discovered that do not fit the theory. Nevertheless, we do not believe 
there are observations within our data that are inconsistent with our conclusions. In this 
article, we consider alternative explanations and we welcome attempts by other scholars 
to replicate our results from our data or to show that our data more accurately fits an 
alternative theory.
We recognise that a single case study cannot claim generalizability. However, we trust 
that in having provided a detailed account of our fieldwork, the descriptive data it gener-
ated and our data analysis processes, our study’s concepts and findings can be used by 
other researchers who wish to conduct a comparison between the trajectory of the EDL 
and other far-right organisations.
The EDL: Rise and fall
The EDL was formed in Luton in March 2009 following a provocative demonstration by 
the Islamist group al-Muhajiroun. The organisation’s mission statement (EDL, 2016) sug-
gests that the EDL engages in peaceful and non-violent activities as part of its ‘struggle 
against global Islamification’. Although it claims to want to utilise the courts and legisla-
ture to protect human rights, democracy and the traditions of England, the EDL favours 
direct action in the form of confrontational demonstrations. Our own and other studies 
have found EDL members to be predominantly White, male and working-class – like 
other far-right parties and organisations (Bartlett and Littler, 2011; Busher, 2016; 
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Kassimeris and Jackson, 2015; Meadowcroft and Morrow, 2017; Pilkington, 2016; 
Treadwell and Garland, 2011).
However, whereas far-right groups such as the National Front and the BNP advocated 
a White supremacist ideology, the EDL does not espouse biological racism. Instead, the 
leadership of the EDL insists it is not a racist organisation. Indeed, one of the EDL’s first 
‘stunts’ was to invite journalists to film members burning a swastika flag (Kassimeris and 
Jackson, 2015: 172). While the EDL has denied racism, and this denial may be genuine, 
the group nevertheless promotes ‘a culturally racist discourse of Islamophobia’ that 
‘involves the demarcation of an in-group and an out-group, where the in-group considers 
itself superior’ (Kassimeris and Jackson, 2015: 184). In this sense, its rejection of plural-
ism and minority rights means it can properly be considered ‘far right’ (Mudde, 2014: 
98). We will show that the EDL’s formal rejection of biological racism was an important 
factor in its initial success but that this rejection became compromised.
EDL membership is a fluid concept. Busher (2016: 6) noted that ‘among activists, 
there were differences of opinion over what it meant to be part of the group’. Bartlett and 
Littler’s (2011: 28–29) survey of online EDL supporters found that 88% of respondents 
who had attended a demonstration self-identified as members. We saw a similar view 
expressed by the administrator of a closed Facebook group following a demonstration in 
Bradford in October 2013: ‘Ty for those of u who attended yesterday n those of u who 
didnt shame on u as ur not true edl members’ (emphasis added). Herein, we assume that 
a member is someone who regularly attends EDL demonstrations.
The EDL quickly grew into a national movement capable of drawing significant num-
bers to its protests. Figure 1 shows the numbers of participants at EDL demonstrations 
from October 2009 to April 2015. Initially, EDL protests were well-attended, with more 
than 2000 protestors regularly present. However, from late-2011, there was a marked 
decline in numbers that continued throughout the next 18 months, with some protests 
Figure 1. Participants at EDL Demonstrations October 2009–April 2015 with Trendline.
Source: Local and national press reports of EDL demonstrations.
Vertical line shows murder of Lee Rigby.
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attracting the small numbers (such as 150 in Keighley in August 2012 and 50 in Cambridge 
in February 2013) that UK far-right groups have historically attracted.
The murder of British soldier Lee Rigby by Islamic extremists in Woolwich, South 
London, on 22 May 2013 produced a sudden upturn in the EDL’s fortunes. An (already-
planned) demonstration in Newcastle 3 days after the murder was attended by 1500 peo-
ple. The two subsequent demonstrations attracted similar numbers – 1000 people were 
present in London on 27 May 2013 and 2000 protestors were in Birmingham in July 
2013. We discuss below why an event like the murder of Lee Rigby can have a dramatic 
impact on people’s willingness to engage in activism, albeit for a limited time, but in the 
present context, the salient point is that the increased numbers were short-lived.
By late-2013, it was clear the EDL could no longer attract thousands of people to its 
demonstrations. Its original leaders, Tommy Robinson and his cousin Kevin Carroll, 
resigned from the organisation in October 2013, claiming that they could ‘no longer keep 
extremist elements at bay’ (Quilliam Foundation, 2013). In 2015, Robinson became the 
leader of Pegida UK, the British counterpart of the German anti-Islamist protest move-
ment. But this organisation failed to replicate the EDL’s early success – only 150 people 
joined the group’s demonstration in Rotherham in June 2016, for example – and it appears 
to have been defunct since 2017.
The conundrum that faced the EDL was that while many people shared the group’s 
ideological concerns – for example, a YouGov (2015) survey showed that over half of UK 
voters thought there was a fundamental clash between Islam and British values – for each 
of those individuals, it was nevertheless rational to freeride on the participation of others 
given that any public goods that the group supplied (e.g. influence over government pol-
icy or increased media attention on the issues members considered important) would be 
provided to participants and non-participants alike.
Meadowcroft and Morrow (2017) have shown that the EDL solved the collective action 
problem by supplying the benefits of access to violence, group solidarity and increased 
self-worth, and that these benefits outweighed the costs of time, money, unwanted police 
attention and stigma for sufficient people to enable the group to hold well-attended dem-
onstrations. This article develops and extends Meadowcroft and Morrow’s analysis by 
identifying the importance of ‘participatory crowding’ in the EDL’s solution of the collec-
tive action problem and explaining the group’s decline, as well as its rise.
Collective Action, Participatory Crowding and Marginal 
Members
In a classic contribution to the economics of religion, Iannaccone (1992) observed that 
the satisfaction an individual derives from participation in organised religious activities 
will depend both on his or her own inputs and also the inputs of others; many facets of 
religious participation such as hymn singing, communion and even speaking in tongues 
are more satisfying and enjoyable when experienced collectively. This phenomenon – 
that individual enjoyment is increased by the participation of others – is known as ‘par-
ticipatory crowding’.
However, Iannaccone (1992) argued that participatory crowding could lead to a par-
ticular form of freeriding: ostensible participants could freeride on the greater contribu-
tion of more committed members. Iannaccone (1992: 281) argued that this was problematic 
because ‘[l]ess committed members threaten to swamp groups that would otherwise have 
high levels of participation’ and, if this happened, the overall quality of club goods such 
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as warm greetings, tuneful singing and religious enthusiasm would decline, threatening 
an exodus of members that might challenge the group’s viability.
Moreover, relating this analysis to Fryer and Levitt’s (2012) study of the Klan, less-
committed, or, as the authors put it, marginal members may undermine collective action 
if they leave a group in response to a change to the internal or external environment and 
thereby compromise the group’s ability to supply benefits to its remaining members. If 
we take seriously the injunction from behavioural economics that people weigh losses 
more heavily than gains –the endowment effect (Kahneman et al., 1990) – then it follows 
that the exit of marginal members harms a group more than if they had not joined at all. 
Being part of a small organisation that was once large is surely less satisfying than being 
a member of a small organisation that was always small.
However, collectives can establish mechanisms to prevent the recruitment of marginal 
members. Iannaccone (1992) and Iannaccone and Berman (2006) suggest that organisa-
tions can require members to engage in stigmatising behaviour that will inhibit participa-
tion in alternative contexts and penalise members for participating in non-collective 
activities.
In this article, we argue that the club goods supplied by EDL participation were 
enhanced through participatory crowding – the more participants in attendance at demon-
strations, the greater the supply of club goods. Like Iannaccone’s collective, the EDL was 
also vulnerable to attracting members without a high level of commitment to the organi-
sation but did not implement the measures identified by Iannaccone and Berman to boost 
levels of commitment. Consequently, EDL numbers swelled into the thousands, but many 
of these members had low levels of commitment which left the organisation vulnerable to 
rapid collapse.
Participatory Crowding and the Mobilisation of the EDL
We found no evidence that EDL leaders (or members) had a coherent plan of how the 
group’s street-based protests would achieve its stated goals. Similarly, Pilkington (2016: 
38) observed that while ‘awareness raising’ was an ostensible reason for the EDL’s dem-
onstrations, in reality, ‘there was little discussion or knowledge of the particular issue 
about which awareness was being raised in advance of the national demos’. Despite the 
low efficacy of street-based protests, mass mobilisation was nevertheless important to the 
EDL. Busher (2016: 128) observed that ‘EDL activists … were all acutely aware that the 
success of the EDL, whatever that might look like, depended to a large extent on the num-
ber of people it was able to attract to its events’ (emphasis added). Similarly, in interview, 
Robinson maintained that if the EDL had presented itself as a traditional right-wing 
extremist group, ‘it wouldn’t have worked, it wouldn’t have got big numbers …’
Although activists often lacked knowledge about the issues that they were purportedly 
trying to raise awareness of and rarely thought their participation would effect change, we 
believe mass mobilisation was nevertheless important to the EDL because the effects of 
participatory crowding enhanced the three key benefits supplied to its members: access to 
violence, increased self-worth and group solidarity.
Previous studies establish that the opportunities for violent conflict provided by 
EDL demonstrations played an important role in attracting members, particularly 
those with a football hooligan background (Busher, 2016; Pilkington, 2016; 
Treadwell and Garland, 2011). These findings cohere with our study. During field-
work, a young male member told a meet-and-greet audience that being in the ‘lion’s 
Morrow and Meadowcroft 9
den’ of counter-protesters was ‘the best part’ of EDL activism, and members were 
seen using drugs before aggressively taunting law enforcement and counter-protest-
ers. In interview, Robinson described the EDL’s hooligan members as men ‘who will 
fight, and want to fight’, and Darren, a Leicester-based factory worker, admitted that 
demonstration violence ‘got me hooked’.
Dynamics of group membership may increase aggressive acts and violence, partly due 
to the perception of personal anonymity provided by a crowd and partly because it is 
more difficult for the police to impose sanctions on individuals in a large group (Drury 
and Reicher, 2009). Robinson understood the benefits conferred by crowd behaviour in 
facilitating violent conflict from his years as a member of the Luton Town football hooli-
gan firm. In interview he revealed that he used similar tactics to mobilise EDL supporters 
and football hooligans. Robinson appeared to understand the importance of anonymity 
and how large crowds could impede the police in penalising offenders, when explaining 
why he supplied balaclavas to participants at a chaotic demonstration in 2009: ‘If [the 
police] see one person wearing a balaclava they’re stopping him. If they see everyone 
wearing balaclavas, they ain’t stopping them’.
EDL participation also increased its members’ self-worth, something understood by 
Lamont (2000) in her study of working-class men to include dignity affirmation, self-
expression, upholding moral codes and displaying competence. Meadowcroft and 
Morrow (2017) suggest that EDL participation bolstered members’ self-worth by pur-
portedly giving them an opportunity to protect their families and country from radical 
Islam’s alleged threat. We would add that EDL participation bestowed an additional 
sense of self-worth on its primarily White, working-class members by providing them 
with an opportunity to celebrate their identity. This was recognised by Robinson in 
interview:
You have to understand that in Luton my whole life as White English I’m a minority in town 
there’s never been anything that celebrates who you are … St Lucian Day … we have a massive 
festival, yeah? Paddy’s Day, massive festival; Eid we have fairground rides, massive, massive 
celebrations, so, there’s a void to be filled … English kids are already walking with their heads 
down, like they should be ashamed of who they are … Now the English Defence League filled 
this massive void for so many people who come and just said, ‘yes, fuck it, this is who I am, this 
is filling my fucking life’ (emphasis added).
Attracting large numbers to demonstrations would therefore enhance participants’ 
feelings of pride and celebration to a greater degree than if the EDL had attracted fewer 
participants.
Finally, EDL participation provided its members with solidarity: unity, oneness of 
purpose and group identification (Wintrobe, 2006: 26). Previous studies have shown that 
EDL members likened their participation to being part of a family and that feelings of 
unity motivated activism (Pilkington, 2016: 179–180; Meadowcroft and Morrow, 2017). 
Self-worth and solidarity may of course overlap: Lamont’s (2000: 49–50) study suggests 
that racial solidarity can be a source of self-worth, and this view is reinforced by 
Robinson’s analysis of why EDL participation was uniquely appealing to its White 
members.
The role of participatory crowding in supplying group solidarity may be more complex 
than its role in facilitating violence and increased self-worth because a large group may 
ostensibly offer less solidarity than a small and insular organisation. But it seems clear 
that members did experience a strong sense of solidarity when attending large EDL 
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events. The emotional benefit of participating within a crowd was recognised by Davie, 
an older EDL member with a history of political activism in mainstream parties:
I’m quite a loner but it does feel good to be with a lot of people who have a common cause and 
I think the one time I did have tears in my eyes was when we was marching, I think it was behind 
the Houses of Parliament, you could see the England flag, you could see Big Ben … I did feel a 
little tearful at that point (emphasis added).
The experience of being one of many like-minded individuals sharing a common expe-
rience elicited solidarity which was amplified through participatory crowding. When 
reflecting on the speeches given by EDL leaders, including Robinson, Darren stated:
The adrenaline and the buzz that you used to feel on these speeches was different. It was like a 
sensation you’ve never felt. It’s weird, it was spine-tingling … because you’re not on your own 
then, you understand? You’re surrounded by people with like-minded mentality (emphasis 
added).
We contend that the amplification of solidarity by participatory crowding can also 
explain the EDL’s short-lived resurgence following the murder of Lee Rigby. As noted, 
1500 people attended an EDL demonstration in Newcastle 3 days after the murder – the 
largest EDL event for almost 2 years. But within a few months, EDL participation returned 
to the levels prior to the murder.
People may benefit from participatory crowding following dramatic events like the 
murder of Lee Rigby because emotions of shock and anger are more powerfully expressed 
collectively – they do not take to the streets alone, but rather seek solidarity with others. 
In the case of the murder of Lee Rigby, the already-planned EDL demonstration targeting 
Islamic extremism provided an obvious forum for people to come together. Fieldwork 
conducted at the demonstration found that many of these additional participants were not 
EDL members who had returned to the fold, but people from outside the EDL who used 
this event to obtain solidarity enhanced by participatory crowding. Once their immediate 
emotional reaction had faded and solidarity was no longer required, these people did not 
continue their EDL involvement. A similar view was put by Darren in interview when 
asked why this surge in EDL activism was not sustained:
I think it was like an instant reaction … Whether they believed in the organisation or not, there 
was people there that day who didn’t believe in the organisation, but that was the only platform 
… once things died down, it don’t affect them no more, and it goes to the back of their mind.
Consequently, the spike in EDL numbers was not sustained.
The Problem of Marginal Members
When collective action is motivated by club goods supplied to participants, then the 
immediate benefits of activism may become more important than the long-term strategic 
goals that activism is supposed to achieve. Mobilisation may become an end in itself, so 
that, as Jasper (2011: 296) wrote, ‘The satisfactions of action … [may] become a motiva-
tion every bit as important as a movement’s stated goals’. Indeed, we believe that for 
many EDL participants, the immediate benefits of activism enhanced by mass mobilisa-
tion became more important than any long-term goals.
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As established above, one of the immediate benefits of EDL activism – access to vio-
lent conflict – was particularly salient for the organisation’s football hooligans. Indeed, an 
important factor in the early success of the EDL was its ability to recruit from hooligan 
networks, as Robinson revealed in interview: ‘I was going on to football messaging 
boards … I was going on all of them … saying “look at this, look at this, look at this”’. 
For many of these hooligans, the EDL served the purpose of providing new opportunities 
for fighting. Pilkington (2016: 79) similarly found evidence that, for some hooligans, 
EDL demonstrations replaced football violence, with one respondent revealing, ‘just as I 
got banned from football the EDL started so guys that I knew that were banned as well 
says “come along Rob, it’s the same sort of thing”’.
However, the EDL’s ability to supply violence was compromised by changed policing 
strategies. Treadwell’s (2014: 128) analysis shows that the policing of the EDL was ini-
tially heavy-handed and reactive; the challenge of keeping the peace between the EDL 
and counter-demonstrators led to public disorder and a high number of arrests. Then, 
policing became ‘premised largely on preventing any real contact between rival groups’ 
and reducing arrests and disorder at demonstrations. A number of demonstrations from 
2009 to 2011 resulted in EDL members breaking through police lines, throwing projec-
tiles and engaging in street fights, but by 2012, this disorder had diminished as the second 
policing strategy took hold. The police more effectively kept EDL and counter-demon-
strations apart, and routed protests away from potential flashpoints such as Islamic cen-
tres, thereby reducing the potential for violent conflict (Treadwell, 2014: 134–135).
At interview, Robinson explained that the numbers at EDL demonstrations declined 
from 2011 because:
The police were successful in what they were doing, the days become quite boring, intentionally-
wise … Tower Hamlets they held everyone in the road for six hours – it’s boring as fuck. Do you 
think I’ve just travelled down from Newcastle to stand in the road for six hours without having 
beer?
Similarly, Darren stated that police action that made EDL protests uneventful with lit-
tle prospect of violence had discouraged attendance:
… you’d have the lads who’d ring me and say, ‘do you think it’s going to kick-off?’ And 
dependent on my answer would be whether they’d turn up or not … that’s why the numbers 
dwindled, because people was just going there, the Old Bill was kettling us in, there was no 
trouble, there was no fighting, and that was it.
The EDL’s football hooligans were particularly vulnerable to assuming the role of 
marginal members and deserting the organisation en masse because they retained their 
ties to another organisation – football firms – that they could return to once EDL activism 
ceased to be enjoyable. In interview, Samantha, a Wolverhampton member, suggested 
that the EDL’s hooligans returned to their football roots once activism became unappeal-
ing: ‘… you just don’t get numbers, they’re not as exciting as what they first were, so 
they’ve gone back to the football …’ Pilkington (2016: 183) similarly found that some 
hooligans returned to their football networks once EDL violence reduced, with one 
respondent stating: ‘… you come to the EDL, you aren’t getting no violence … But if you 
go to a football match, you’ve got 50 times more chance of having a kick-off …’
The modification of police tactics reduced violence and made EDL events boring, 
thereby leading to an exodus of marginal members – a significant proportion of the EDL 
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given that Busher (2016: 38) estimated hooligans comprised between 30% and 40% of 
members. The changed police tactics may be understood as an exogenous shock that 
reduced a key benefit for many members.
The exit of these marginal members was significant to the EDL’s downfall for three 
reasons. First, it reduced the participatory crowding essential to the consumption of the 
other club goods supplied. As the organisation became smaller, the benefits of self-worth 
and solidarity for those who remained were reduced.
Second, because the organisation measured its success by the numbers in attendance at 
its events, the decline in participation convinced members that the group was failing and 
this led to internal recriminations that further undermined the supply of self-worth and 
solidarity. Indeed, many respondents identified in-fighting or ‘backstabbing’ as a principal 
reason for the group’s collapse. In-fighting made EDL membership less enjoyable.
Third, the exit of marginal members increased the relative salience of the EDL’s bio-
logical racists who adhered to a White supremacist ideology. There is evidence from our 
own research, and that of Busher (2016) and Pilkington (2016), that many EDL activists 
had a history of activism in overtly racist organisations, such as the National Front and 
BNP. These biological racists had two negative effects on the organisation. First, as 
Robinson explained in interview, some of these members formed ‘inner circles’ within 
the EDL and tried to attract others to their White supremacist sub-groups. Robinson 
recounted that the presence of biological racists ‘became such a big burden on me, con-
stantly battling them’ and precipitated his decision to resign.
Second, biologically racist members reduced the self-worth and group solidarity other 
members derived from their participation. We found evidence that members had with-
drawn from the EDL because of the presence of open racists. As Davie recounted:
Things started to get a bit sinister after the [2013] Newcastle demo. I went to a meet-and-greet 
in Huntingdon and there were a bunch of people in the middle of the pub doing Hitler salutes to 
the time of the song, you know, the full thing, from the chest up, which is something I’d never 
seen before … I left [the EDL] after that. I was quite disgusted.
Someone who did not hold racist views could not obtain self-worth or group solidarity 
from participation in an organisation in which people openly espoused biological racism 
and used Nazi symbolism. Moreover, given that one of the most important costs associ-
ated with EDL membership was stigma – particularly, the stigma of belonging to what 
many outside the EDL believed was a racist organisation – the presence of open racism 
increased the costs of EDL activism. Marginal members may have effectively masked the 
number of committed racists within the EDL, so that their exit left an organisation with a 
significant proportion of racist members.
When these negative consequences are placed in the context of the endowment effect 
noted above, the transformation of the EDL from what members believed was a non-racist 
mass movement to a small and fractious group riddled with racists would have had a dev-
astating effect on people’s willingness to participate and hence the group’s fortunes.
A Failure of Self-Governance
The recruitment of marginal members within a political organisation is not inevitable; 
rather, organisational failures left the EDL particularly vulnerable to such recruitment. 
Iannaccone (1992) and Iannaccone and Berman (2006) contend that collectives can impose 
requirements of deviant behaviour and penalise activities that compete for member 
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resources, as mechanisms to ensure commitment. When implemented effectively, these 
mechanisms can increase the demand for internal substitutes and the utility of group mem-
bership. We consider each mechanism, and the EDL’s failure to implement it, in turn.
Iannaccone (1992) suggests that bizarre dress standards – such as shaved heads or 
robes – can invite scorn and stigma on a group member, thereby inhibiting participation 
in other, more mainstream, contexts. Although Iannaccone’s examples are derived from 
religion, there is evidence that some far-right groups make similar demands of members: 
studies into neo-Nazism show that being labelled as a ‘deviant’ may be a group joining 
requirement, with members being required to appear in public wearing a ‘nationalist’ 
uniform. This leads to isolation and disassociation from existing social networks, thereby 
boosting reliance on – and commitment to – the organisation (Blee, 2009; Hundeide, 
2003: 110–112).
Conversely, the EDL did not enforce dress codes or require behaviour that would devi-
ate from standard social norms. While stigma is a cost of EDL participation, members 
could reduce it. Numerous participants at EDL demonstrations wore face coverings, such 
as balaclavas or pig masks, to preserve their anonymity. Indeed, Robinson sought to hide 
his identity by wearing balaclavas at early protests and adopting a pseudonym. During a 
national demonstration in Manchester, members sought to avoid counter-demonstrators 
who were trying to photograph them because, as Samantha explained, ‘some members 
are trying to keep their identities hidden’. Similarly, a divisional Facebook administrator 
expressed concern that she would not be able to attend a local demonstration because it 
would be at her place of work – a university where she supervised cafeteria workers. 
Other members revealed that they had two Facebook accounts: one used for EDL activi-
ties and another for general use.
Far from imposing stigmatising behavioural standards, the EDL allowed members to 
hide their organisational affiliation and avoid the stigma that may otherwise follow, 
thereby differentiating it from other far-right organisations and Iannaccone and Berman’s 
collectives. That the EDL was willing to shield members from stigma also separates it 
from Iannaccone’s (1992: 276) collectives where ‘[p]otential members are forced to 
choose: participate fully or not at all’. Had the EDL required more stigmatising behaviour 
of its members – for example, banning face coverings, imposing a uniform or requiring 
members to share EDL content on social media – it may have screened out marginal 
members and boosted commitment levels among members willing to adhere to the organ-
isation’s demands. Of course, this would almost certainly have prevented the EDL from 
attracting large numbers of people to its early demonstrations.
The other mechanism identified by Iannaccone (1992) and Iannaccone and Berman 
(2006) to guarantee commitment to the collective is to prohibit or penalise activities that 
compete for member resources, such as friendships within secular society. A similar pro-
cess has been observed in some far-right organisations: Bjorgo (2002: 10–14) notes that 
the process of joining a neo-Nazi group often involves reducing contact with family and 
friends; if a neo-Nazi’s relationships with friends and family are harmed through his or 
her participation in the group, then that individual may find it difficult to sever organisa-
tional ties.
Conversely, EDL members were not required to reduce pre-existing social connections 
to non-EDL friends and family, and to football firms. We never observed any attempts 
made by EDL leaders to sanction external socialising, and indeed, members openly 
referred to friends or spouses who were not part of the organisation. Similarly, football 
hooligan firm involvement co-existed alongside EDL participation for many members, 
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with Busher (2016: 137) noting that hooligan members tended to identify, and be identi-
fied, as ‘football lads’. Robinson additionally revealed at interview that it was easy for 
him to leave the EDL because he had retained his ties with the Luton Town football firm, 
explaining that, ‘if you take the EDL away I’ve still got a massive social circle through 
football really’. The EDL often did not become the centre of a member’s social life, 
thereby distinguishing it from Iannaccone’s collectives and other, more restrictive, far-
right organisations.
Fieldwork suggested that members whose outside relationships were harmed by EDL 
participation were more long-standing. For example, during a conversation in a pub in 
April 2013, one Leicester-based bouncer who remained part of his division as numbers 
declined recounted that when he publicly declared his EDL involvement, he lost friends 
and people avoided him; ultimately his social circle principally consisted of other EDL 
members. Another long-term member admitted that his mother had not spoken to him for 
4 years because of his EDL involvement. For these members, it was difficult to return to 
their old social circles or find new social connections outside the EDL. Therefore, they 
remained loyal to the organisation.
Although the EDL could have sought to guard against marginal members by prohibit-
ing activities that competed for member resources, doing so would have increased the 
costs of participation and alienated many of the EDL’s initial members, especially those 
drawn from football hooligan networks. Like stigmatising behaviour, this would surely 
have limited its initial ability to solve the collective action problem and produced a 
smaller organisation.
Finally, even if the EDL had imposed the measures contemplated by Iannaccone and 
Berman, the organisation may have still been powerless to stop the infiltration by biologi-
cal racists. This is because the previous studies considered herein suggest that individuals 
who participate in White supremacist organisations are willing to comply with stigmatis-
ing and alienating requirements. To prevent the attendance of biological racists, the EDL 
could have sought to implement some of the mechanisms for radical right longevity con-
templated by De Lange and Art (2011), particularly, the careful vetting of activists. 
However, to do so would have had two consequences. First, the vetting of activists would 
have imposed an administrative burden on EDL leaders. Former Regional Organiser 
Luke admitted in interview that no rigorous attempts were made to screen prospective 
members because it was ‘hard work’ looking at their Facebook profile. Second, the EDL 
would have needed to make attendance at demonstrations invite-only; the open nature of 
its events meant that anyone – including biological racists – could attend, with Luke not-
ing: ‘… you can’t stop people going, that’s the trouble, ’cos it’s an open event and any-
body can turn up. You used to … throw the odd person out but you’d never see ’em in all 
them people’. If all activists had been vetted and attendance at demonstrations made 
invite-only, then it is likely that the EDL could have prevented infiltration, but these 
measures would also have hindered its capacity for mass mobilisation.
The collapse of the EDL was caused by the internal supply-side factor of weak self-
governance that meant it became unable to meet member demands. The organisation 
expanded rapidly after its launch in 2009, relying on the intuitive understanding of how 
to recruit members held by its leading figures. However, this fast, almost spontaneous, 
growth meant that the organisation did not have the governance structures necessary to 
ensure its long-term sustainability. Of course, if such mechanisms had been in place, then 
the organisation would almost certainly not have grown so rapidly. Hence, the basis of the 
organisation’s early success was also the cause of its eventual demise.
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When Robinson launched Pegida UK in 2015, he sought to implement some of the 
self-governance mechanisms suggested above, a decision we assume was informed by his 
experience of the failure of the EDL. Face coverings were banned, ostensibly so partici-
pants did not appear thuggish, but this also meant that participants could not avoid the 
possibility of being recognised. Importantly, Pegida UK held silent demonstrations with 
its first two events staged at a Birmingham industrial estate, thereby signalling the unlike-
lihood of violent confrontation. In interview, Robinson stated that Pegida UK demonstra-
tions were ‘silent, no chanting, teetotal, so people understand … I’m not coming for a 
fight. If we wanna come for a fight … we wouldn’t be marching in the middle of nowhere 
…’ As the account set out here would lead one to expect, Pegida UK’s uneventful, peace-
ful demonstrations attracted relatively few participants and a silent march through 
Rotherham in 2016 was its last public event.
Alternative Explanations
As noted in the introduction, two principal alternative explanations for the rise and fall of 
the EDL have been proposed. First, the leadership of Tommy Robinson has been cited as 
an important determinant of the group’s fortunes (Goodwin et al., 2016: 5; Pilkington, 
2016: 40–41). Here, the resignation of Robinson is understood to have humiliated and 
demoralised supporters, and triggered the fragmentation of the group. We do not believe 
the evidence supports this explanation of the EDL’s fortunes. As discussed above, at inter-
view, Robinson described the mounting problems he encountered running the organisa-
tion, which he came to view as insurmountable, convincing him that the group had little 
long-term future and precipitating his resignation. We therefore believe Robinson’s resig-
nation from the EDL was a symptom, not a cause, of its failure. In addition, the decline in 
EDL numbers began in late-2011, 2 years before Robinson resigned. Although Robinson 
was a popular figure, we found no evidence that he commanded loyalty or devotion from 
members. Discussing Robinson’s role in the EDL, Davie explained, ‘I like listening to 
him because he expresses himself well, but I don’t feel drawn to him’, and that even if 
Robinson had remained leader, ‘after I saw the people doing the Hitler salute in the pub I 
would have left [anyway]’. It is also salient that Robinson’s post-EDL venture, Pegida 
UK, did not replicate the EDL’s success, despite his presence at its head, suggesting he 
alone was not a powerful draw for activists.
Second, it has been suggested that the EDL collapsed because of in-fighting and ‘fac-
tioning’ that created tension within the group and led to the formation of White suprema-
cist splinter organisations such as the North-West Infidels (Busher, 2016: Chapter 5; 
Pilkington, 2016: 54–55). Indeed, a number of respondents attributed the decline of the 
EDL to in-fighting and ‘backstabbing’. However, our research suggests that weak self-
governance encouraged these conflicts; Robinson’s powerlessness to prevent rival 
groups affiliating themselves with the EDL and seeking to recruit their members to its 
ranks created factions. It is also clear that in-fighting became a significant problem as the 
organisation failed. Respondents repeatedly described recriminations taking place after 
poorly attended demonstrations, with members accusing one another and the leadership 
of not doing what was required to make the organisation successful. While the decline of 
the organisation was accompanied by in-fighting and factioning, we believe the evi-
dence shows this too was a symptom rather than a cause. In-fighting may have acceler-
ated the process of decline because it made membership less enjoyable, but at root 
in-fighting was caused by weak self-governance mechanisms and was a response to the 
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decline of the organisation as members blamed one another and the leadership as the 
organisation faltered.
Conclusion
This article has used the theory of collective action to understand the rise and subsequent 
decline of the EDL using new data that open the ‘black box’ of a far-right organisation. 
This approach has enabled the identification of the relevant demand- and supply-side fac-
tors: The EDL supplied benefits that satisfied activists’ demands for violence, self-worth 
and solidarity and were enhanced by participatory crowding. This enabled the group to 
not only grow quickly and put thousands of people on the streets but also fuelled indis-
criminate recruitment that increased the presence of marginal members with low levels of 
commitment whose subsequent exit reduced participatory crowding and increased the 
relative salience of biological racists within the organisation.
The EDL developed quickly and relatively spontaneously, driven by its leading mem-
bers’ intuitive grasp of collective action dynamics but consequently did not have in place 
the self-governance mechanisms that might have ensured the commitment of members 
and screened out biological racists. Our analysis suggests that if far-right organisations do 
not establish effective self-governance mechanisms then their long-term viability will be 
compromised.
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